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ABSTRACT
I examine whether SFAS 161 derivatives disclosures affect corporate risk management
behavior. First, I find that the adoption of SFAS 161 has real effects on firms’ risk management
strategy, resulting in lower overall derivatives use and speculation with derivatives. Second, I find that
SFAS 161 also has an accounting effect as managers seem to avoid hedge accounting, and prefer to
use non-designated derivatives after the introduction of the standard. Finally, I develop a new method
to determine whether the accounting designation of derivatives informs financial statement users of
their economic use (speculate or hedge). My findings show that, while the accounting designation of
derivatives is informative of their economic use in general, it is less informative after the adoption of
SFAS 161. Overall, firms’ response to SFAS 161-derivatives disclosures is mixed. On the one hand,
firms engage in more prudent risk management, decreasing the extent to which they speculate with
derivatives. On the other hand, firms reduce the extent of overall derivatives use, which may lower
the benefits associated with hedging derivatives.
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11. INTRODUCTION
Derivative financial instruments are well known for their economic complexity, especially
when used in intricate hedging and speculative transactions. These complexities appear to be the cause
for a long series of financial accounting standards that deal with accounting and disclosure issues
relating to derivatives and hedging activities. Specifically, the FASB has issued ten derivatives related
standards over the period 1981-2008 and is currently considering additional regulatory guidance
(FASB 2015). SFAS 161, the last standard in the series, significantly increases disclosure requirements
for derivatives and hedging activities. In my study, I use derivatives data collected from a sample of
1,000 large non-financial firms’ 10-K reports covering the period from 2001 to 2013 to investigate the
impact of SFAS 161-mandated derivatives disclosures on these firms’ risk management activities.
Specifically, I examine the real effects of SFAS 161 on overall derivatives use and speculation with
derivatives and its accounting effects on the designation of derivatives. The results are of interest not
only to users of financial statements who need information to evaluate a firm’s risk management,
but also to the Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB) as it amends accounting and disclosure
requirements for derivatives. The fact that the FASB is currently considering additional regulation
indicates that SFAS 161 has not solved disclosure issues that existed before its issuance and/or it
created new issues.
The introduction of SFAS 161 has generated a debate over how mandatory hedge disclosures
affect firms’ risk management activities. On the one hand, critics argue that mandatory derivatives
disclosures pose high proprietary costs (comment letters to the exposure draft (ED) of SFAS 161) and
may result in a decrease in derivatives use, as managers try to protect their private information and
raise entry barriers (Hoang and Ruckes 2013)1. On the other hand, mandatory derivatives disclosures
1In this paper, I use the term hedging derivatives (as opposed to speculative) to refer to derivatives that reduce a firm’s risk
exposure and designated derivatives (as opposed to non-designated) to refer to derivatives designated as accounting
2may not result in a decrease in derivatives use if the hedging benefits outweigh the costs of disclosure.
For example, prior literature has documented a number of benefits associated with derivatives use,
like lower risk (Guay 1999), lower current and cash effective tax rates (Donohoe 2015), and lower
underinvestment (Nance et al. 1993). Given these documented benefits of hedging derivatives, it is
important to understand if firms change the extent to which they use derivatives in response to
increased disclosure requirements after the adoption of SFAS 161.
Further, proponents of the standard argue that derivatives disclosures allow investors to
evaluate the impact of derivatives on the financial statements, which may provide incentives for more
prudent risk management choices. However, theoretical research suggests that mandatory derivatives
disclosures may induce firms to take an excessive speculative position with derivatives (Sapra 2002).
Examining factors that drive speculation is important as survey evidence indicates that a large number
of firms speculate (Geczy, Minton, and Schrand 2007; Bartram, Brown, and Conrad 2011). While the
dollar significance and net profits related to speculation are modest (Hentschel and Kothari 2001;
Brown, Crabb, and Haushalter 2006), the highly publicized derivatives-related losses suggest that
speculation can have a material impact on a firm. Whether or not firms increase or decrease the extent
to which they speculate with derivatives due to mandatory hedge disclosures remains an open question
(Kanodia and Sapra 2015). My study fills this void in the literature and is the first to provide evidence
on the real effects of mandatory derivatives disclosures on derivatives use and speculation with
derivatives, in an empirical setting.
Finally, I examine the accounting effects of mandatory derivatives disclosures. Specifically, I
analyze whether the accounting designation of derivatives is informative of derivatives economic use
and whether mandatory derivatives disclosures affect the designation. The accounting designation of
hedges (cash flow, fair value or net investment hedges). Further, accounting designation refers to a firm’s choice to designate
qualifying derivatives as hedges for accounting purposes.
3derivatives is informative if it reflects derivatives’ economic use (i.e., whether firms use designated
derivatives for hedging purposes and non-designated derivatives for speculation). While the FASB
requires hedging derivatives to be effective hedges of a hedge item (e.g., asset or liability), it does not
require hedging derivatives to be effective hedges of the firm’s overall risk exposure. Take for example
a firm with both future revenues and expenses in a foreign currency, but with a net revenue exposure
(revenues exceed expenses). The ideal hedging would be to use derivatives to hedge the currency risk
associated with the excess revenue. A derivative that hedges a future expense in the foreign currency
(e.g., a forecasted purchase of raw materials) may be an effective hedge of the forecasted purchase.
However, given that the net exposure of the firm is on the revenue side, hedging a future expense
exposes future revenue to currency risk, and the overall position is more speculative than without the
use of the derivative. Therefore, this derivative is speculative with respect to the firm’s overall
exposure, as it increases the net exposure to foreign currency risk.
Further, SFAS 161 may change firms’ incentives to designate derivatives because it requires
fewer disclosures for non-designated derivatives. Examining whether the accounting designation of
derivatives is informative of derivatives’ economic use is important as investors may rely on the
accounting designation to determine how firms use derivatives, even in the presence of detailed
derivatives disclosures. For example, prior research suggests that both investors and analysts struggle
to process derivatives related information (Koonce, Lipe, and McAnally 2005; Cambell, Downes, and
Schwartz 2015) and that the additional disclosures provided by SFAS 161 do not help analysts improve
their forecasts (Chang, Donohoe, and Sougiannis 2016). Whether or not the accounting designation
of derivatives is informative of their economic use and how mandatory derivatives disclosures change
the conveyed information remain open questions. My study provides evidence on these issues.
SFAS 161, “Disclosures about Derivative Instruments and Hedging Activities”, effective for
fiscal years beginning after November 15 2008, significantly expands the derivatives and hedging
4disclosure requirements imposed by SFAS 133 (FASB 1998), without changing the accounting for
derivatives. It requires disclosure of fair values and gains and losses related to derivatives by underlying
risk hedged, accounting designation, and income statement or balance sheet line items affected. SFAS
161 does not require disclosures of the notional amounts of derivatives. The adoption of SFAS 161
represents a shock to derivatives and hedging disclosures, and provides a setting to examine the impact
of mandatory hedge disclosures on risk management choices.
The adoption of SFAS 161 was contemporaneous with other events that may affect firms’ risk
management choices. To alleviate concerns that macroeconomic or other factors in the post-SFAS
161 period and not mandatory derivatives disclosures drive my results, I construct a variable (COSTD)
that captures the cost imposed by the standard. I classify firms as either high cost (HC) or low cost
(LC) based on the magnitude of the change in derivatives disclosures made in response to the adoption
of SFAS 161. COSTD takes the value of 1 for firm in the top quartile of the change in disclosure
(HC), and 0 otherwise (LC). The idea behind this measure is that the cost of compliance imposed by
SFAS 161 is higher for firms that made few voluntary disclosures prior to the adoption of SFAS161
and increased mandatory derivatives disclosures in response to the standard.
I first assess whether or not firms decrease the extent to which they use derivatives after the
adoption of SFAS 161. I measure the extent of derivatives use as the notional amount of derivatives,
scaled by lagged total assets. For HC firms, I find a significant reduction in the notional amount of
derivatives in the post-SFAS 161 period, as compared to the pre-SFAS 161 period, after controlling
for endogeneity and factors that explain derivatives use. In contrast, I find no significant change in
the notional amount of derivatives for LC firms. Second, I examine whether firms increase or decrease
the extent of speculation in response to mandatory derivatives disclosures. Following prior literature,
I measure the extent of speculation as the residual from annual cross-sectional regressions of the
notional amount of derivatives on firm fundamentals (Brown et al. 2006; Beber and Fabbri 2012). I
5test whether the differences in the mean and median of speculation between the pre- and post-SFAS
161 periods are significant. In a univariate analysis, I find that the extent of speculation decreased
significantly in the post-SFAS 161 period for HC firms but, not for LC firms.
Third, I examine whether or not the accounting designation of derivatives is informative of
derivatives economic use and if this relation changes after the adoption of SFAS 161. I find that the
accounting designation of derivatives is informative of their economic use, as designated derivatives
are associated with hedging incentives and are effective hedges of firms’ overall exposure, while non-
designated derivatives are not. This suggests that firms are more likely to use designated than non-
designated derivatives to hedge firm’s overall risk exposure.
Finally, I find that both HC and LC firms reduce the extent of designated derivatives used and
increase the extent of non-designated derivatives used after the adoption of SFAS 161. At the same
time, the hedge effectiveness of designated derivatives decreases following the standard’s adoption,
indicating that firms designate fewer hedging derivatives as accounting hedges. Further, I find that
firms increase the extent of non-designated derivatives while reducing speculation. Taken together,
these findings suggest that the accounting designation of derivatives is less informative of derivatives
economic use after the adoption of SFAS 161.
With this study, I contribute to three streams in the accounting and finance literature. First, I
contribute to the literature that investigates the economic consequences of derivatives use and
derivatives regulation. Prior empirical studies examine the impact of SFAS 133 on the extent of
derivatives use and firm risk (Singh 2004; Zhang 2009; Papa 2010; Lins, Servaes, and Tamayo 2011;
Chen, Tan, and Wang 2013) and the impact of SFAS 161 disclosures on entry decisions (Zou 2013).
Theoretical studies also examine the effect of mandatory derivatives and hedge disclosures on
derivatives use (DeMarzo and Duffie 1995; Sapra 2002; Hoang and Ruckes 2013). I add to this
literature by providing first empirical evidence of the effect of mandatory derivatives disclosures on
6the extent of derivatives use, the extent of speculation with derivatives, and the informativeness of the
accounting designation of derivatives.
Second, my study contributes to the growing literature that examines the hedge effectiveness
and accounting designation of derivatives. An extensive body of empirical studies investigate firm
characteristics that theory suggests are associated with firms’ use of hedging (see Aretz and Bartram
2010 for a review of the literature) and speculative derivatives (Brown et al. 2006; Adam, Fernando,
and Salas 2008; Beber and Fabbri 2012). Zhang (2009) develops a measure of hedge effectiveness
using the change in risk exposure after the initiation of a derivatives program. I add to this literature
by showing that the accounting designation of derivatives is related to their economic use. I find that
designated derivatives are related to hedging incentives and are effective hedges of firms’ overall
exposure, while non-designated derivatives are not. This implies that firms are more likely to use
designated derivatives than non-designated derivatives for hedging purposes. I also contribute to the
literature by developing a new method to determine hedge effectiveness, as the extent to which
derivatives gains and losses offset gains and losses before taxes and derivatives. Compared to the
classification developed by Zhang (2009), this method can be utilized for derivatives users as well as
new users and it measures derivatives hedge effectiveness directly.
Third, my study also contributes to the existing literature on the real effects of mandatory
disclosures. While numerous studies examine the price effects of new disclosure requirements, few
studies examine the real effects of these disclosures. This gap in the literature led Leuz and Wysocki
(2008) and Kanodia and Sapra (2015) to call for more research on the real outcomes of disclosure
regulation. To date, a few studies examine the real effects of mandatory non-financial information.
For example, Jin and Leslie (2003) find that a mandatory increase in the product quality information
disclosed to consumers has real effects on firms’ choices of product quality. Further, Christensen,
Floyd, Liu, and Maffett (2016) show that firms’ dissemination of non-financial information through
7financial reports has real effects, even if the content of the disclosure is already publicly available. My
study adds to this literature by providing evidence of real effects of mandatory financial disclosures.
Finally, my study is informative to standard setters, as the FASB is currently considering
additional derivatives and hedge disclosures (FASB 2015). Overall, my results suggest that firms’
response to mandatory derivatives disclosures is mixed. On the one hand, SFAS 161 is associated with
more prudent risk management, as firms decrease the extent to which they speculate with derivatives.
On the other hand, firms reduce the extent of overall derivatives use, which may lower the benefits
associated with hedging derivatives. Further, the accounting designation of derivatives may be less
informative to investors after the adoption of SFAS 161, as the accounting designation is less related
to their economic use.
Section 2 provides background information on derivatives accounting and reporting and prior
academic research, and Section 3 develops my hypotheses. Sample selection and research design are
described in Sections 4 and 5. Section 6 reports the main results and Section 7 concludes.
82. BACKGROUND
Derivatives accounting and reporting
Derivatives are important and effective tools for risk management (SEC 1997). The last two
decades have witnessed a spectacular growth of 1,200% in derivatives use, a growth unmatched by
any other economic activity (Abdel-Khalik and Chen 2015). Over the past 30 years, the FASB has
issued a series of standards providing accounting and disclosure guidance for derivatives. Initially,
SFAS 52 (FASB 1981) and SFAS 80 (FASB 1984) established derivatives accounting rules and SFAS
105 (FASB 1990), SFAS 107 (FASB 1991), and SFAS 119 (FASB 1994) provided disclosure guidance.
However, the accounting treatment and required disclosures prescribed by these standards were
incomplete and inconsistent, depending on the type of financial instrument used or management’s
intent for using derivatives. The fair values of non-hedging derivatives were recorded on the balance
sheet, while the unrealized gains and losses were reported in the income statement. However, hedging
derivatives were recognized in the same manner as the hedged item, which often was historical cost.
Since most non-financial firms claim to use hedging derivatives, and the historical cost of derivatives
is often zero or negligible, many derivatives were off-balance-sheet (FASB 1998).
To address these concerns, the FASB issued SFAS 133 (FASB 1998) and SFAS 138 (FASB
2000), both effective June 2000. These standards define derivatives and require firms to recognize
derivatives as assets and liabilities on the balance sheet at fair value.  Fair value recognition of
derivatives increases income volatility as gains and losses on derivatives are included in earnings.
Hedge accounting, permitted under SFAS 133, reduces income volatility for qualifying derivatives in
hedging relations by allowing firms to recognize gains and losses on derivatives in the same period as
the gains and losses on the hedged item. Under SFAS 133, derivatives may be designated as: (i) hedges
of the exposure to variable cash flows of an asset or liability or a forecasted transaction (cash flow
hedge); (ii) hedges of the exposure to changes in the fair value of a recognized asset or liability or a
9firm commitment (fair value hedge); or (iii) hedges of the foreign currency exposure of a net
investment in a foreign operation (net investment hedge). The adoption of SFAS 133 led to some
implementation issues that were later addressed in SFAS 149 (FASB 2003) and SFAS 155 (FASB
2006).
SFAS 133 requires firms to disclose (i) net gains/losses recognized in earnings representing
hedge ineffectiveness and amounts excluded from the assessment of hedge effectiveness (fair value
and cash flow hedges); (ii) gains/losses recognized in earnings when a hedged firm commitment no
longer qualifies as a fair value hedge; (iii) estimates of amounts to be reclassified from OCI into
earnings in the next 12 months (cash flow hedges); (iv) amounts reclassified into earnings as a result
of discontinued cash flow hedges; and (v) gains or losses included in cumulative translation adjustment
during the reporting period (net investment hedges). However, the standard has been criticized for
not requiring enough information to allow users to assess the impact of derivatives and hedging
activities on firms’ financial statements (FASB 2008).
In response to these concerns, the FASB issued SFAS 161: “Disclosures about Derivative
Instruments and Hedging Activities,” effective for fiscal years beginning after November 15, 2008.
SFAS 161 requires enhanced derivatives disclosures, without changing the accounting for derivatives.
It requires disclosures of fair values and gains and losses in a tabular format. Further, entities are
required to disaggregate fair values and gains and losses by underlying risk (foreign exchange, interest
rate, commodity price, equity price, and credit risk), accounting designation (derivatives designated as
cash flow, fair value, net investment hedges, or non-designated derivatives), and income statement
and balance sheet line items affected. The statement aims to improve transparency in financial
reporting by providing information on how and why an entity uses derivatives, how derivatives are
accounted for under SFAS 133, and how derivatives and hedging activities affect an entity’s financial
position, financial performance, and cash flows. Moreover, in a recent Board Meeting, the FASB
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tentatively decided to further amend hedge accounting disclosures and plans to develop a staff draft
of the proposed Accounting Standards Update to amend Topic 815 (FASB 2015).
Hedging versus speculation
Hedging with derivatives reduces both the exposure to changes in the fair value of assets,
liabilities and firm commitments and the exposure to the variability in cash flows of assets, liabilities
and forecasted transactions (FASB 1998). Designated derivatives are by definition highly effective
hedges of a specific item, like an asset, liability, or a forecasted transaction. However, with respect to
the firm’s overall net exposure, designated derivatives may even be speculative (Ryan 2011).
Speculation is “the attempt to profit from anticipating movements in market rates and prices” (GAO
1994) and “implies that the derivative position is undertaken with the primary intention of making
profit or increasing risk” (Geczy et al. 2007). This practice is referred to in the literature as selective
hedging or “taking a view.” Managers may hedge selectively by adjusting the extent to which they
hedge an existing exposure (over- or underhedge) based on their views of future price movements.
To evaluate firms’ hedging and speculative activities, investors need derivatives and hedge disclosures.
Literature review
My study is related to the literature on the economic consequences of derivatives use and
derivatives regulation. Prior studies examine whether the adoption of SFAS 133 led to a decrease in
the extent of derivatives use. Lins et al. (2011) and Chen et al. (2013), in a survey and an experiment,
respectively, find that managers use fewer derivatives when the derivatives are measured at fair value
instead of historical cost. In contrast, Papa (2010) fails to find a decrease in derivatives use after the
adoption of SFAS 133. Another line of research investigates the informativeness of derivatives
disclosures and the impact of accounting regulation. In an experiment, Koonce et al. (2005) find that
investors struggle to understand the information provided by derivatives. Further, Chang et al. (2016)
find that while analysts routinely misjudge the earnings implications of derivatives use, a series of
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derivatives accounting standards help improve analysts’ forecasts over time. However, they find that
the additional disclosures provided after SFAS 161 do not improve analysts’ forecasts. On the other
hand, Zou (2013) finds that unrealized gain/losses on derivatives in cash flow hedges are more
informative to potential entrants after the implementation of SFAS 161, suggesting that the additional
disclosures mandated by SFAS 161 provide useful information to the market.
Two theoretical studies explore the effect of mandatory hedge disclosures on derivatives.
Sapra (2002) finds that disclosures of derivatives positions have an indirect effect on firm value
because the hedging and production decisions are based on managers’ private information about the
spot market. Surprisingly, the results suggest that under mandatory hedge disclosures, the firm, rather
than being more prudent in its risk management, actually increases its speculative positions as
managers have incentives to take derivatives positions that imply a high private signal. Hoang and
Ruckes (2013) examine the impact of mandatory hedge disclosures on the extent of derivatives use
and find that mandatory hedge disclosures may result in a decrease in hedging derivatives as managers
try to protect firms’ private information and raise entry barriers. My study adds to this literature by
providing the first empirical evidence of the effect of SFAS 161 on the extent of overall derivatives
use, speculation with derivatives, and the extent to which the accounting designation of derivatives
reflects their economic use.
My study also adds to the growing literature on the economic use and accounting designation
of derivatives. A few studies calculate the portion of derivatives use that is attributable to speculation
and examine the firm characteristics associated with speculation. Brown et al. (2006) find that few firm
characteristics are associated with speculation. They find a significant relation between speculation
and growth opportunities, but no association with firm size, the probability of bankruptcy, financial
flexibility, or ownership structure. Further, while there is considerable evidence of selective hedging,
the economic gains to selective hedging are small (Adam and Fernando 2006; Brown et al. 2006). Two
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studies classify firms directly as either hedgers or speculators based on changes in risk exposure and
on derivatives accounting designation. Zhang (2009) develops a measure of hedge effectiveness based
on changes in risk exposure after the initiation of a derivatives program. She classifies firms as effective
hedgers if risk exposure decreases after the initiation of a derivatives program, and speculators
otherwise. However, this measure can only be used to classify new users (not all derivatives users) as
speculators or hedgers. Furthermore, the measure is not specific to derivatives use. For example, if
derivatives initiation is part of a new risk management program, this classification picks up the
effectiveness of the overall risk management program, not that of the derivatives program.
Further, Manchiraju, Pierce, and Sridharan (2014) examine how the accounting designation of
derivatives relates to firm risk. The authors find that the use of derivatives designated as cash flow
hedges is associated with lower firm risk, while the use of non-designated derivatives is associated with
higher firm risk. However, in the cross-section, it is hard to interpret the association between
derivatives use and firm risk (Guay 1999). I add to this literature by developing a method to determine
hedge effectiveness that can be used to classify both new users and users of derivatives as hedgers or
speculators and can measure derivatives hedge effectiveness directly. I further add to the literature by
examining whether the accounting designation of derivatives relates to hedging and speculative
incentives and by separately examining the hedge effectiveness of designated and non-designated
derivatives.
Finally, my study is related to the literature that investigates the real effects of mandatory
disclosures. Engel, Hayes, and Wang (2007) analyze firms’ going private decisions around SOX, while
Gao, Wu, and Zimmerman (2007) provide evidence that SOX size-based exemptions provide
incentives for firms to remain small and have real effects on investment. However, as SOX prescribes
both corporate practices and mandatory disclosures, it is hard to separate the impact of mandatory
disclosures on managers’ real actions. A few studies investigate the impact of non-financial mandatory
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disclosures on firm’s real activities. For example, Jin and Leslie (2003) find that a mandatory increase
in the product quality information disclosed to consumers has real effects on firms’ choices of product
quality. Further, Christensen et al. (2016) show that firms’ dissemination of non-financial information
through financial reports has real effects, even if the content of the disclosure is already publicly
available. Specifically, they find that mandatory non-financial disclosures of mine safety records  has
real effects on mining-related citations and injuries, as well as labor productivity in a sample of mines
owned by SEC-registered issuers. My study adds to this literature by investigating the impact of
mandatory financial disclosures on firms’ real decisions regarding the extent of derivatives use and
speculation with derivatives.
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3. HYPOTHESIS DEVELOPMENT
Managers have proprietary information about the future performance and activities of the
company and they use this proprietary information when making hedging decisions. Disclosures
related to derivatives used in cash flow hedges of a forecasted transaction (whether or not designated
as a hedging derivative) may provide information about forecasted, but unrecorded, sales, purchases
or debt issuances. For example, a manufacturing firm that plans to increase production in the next
period may enter into cash flow hedges of forecasted purchases of raw materials. The disclosures
related to the derivatives and the hedged item provide information about future production.
In addition, managers may have proprietary information regarding future market prices and
may use that information to adjust their hedging portfolios. In a survey of gold producers, managers
cited long-term and near-term market views on gold prices as the two most important factors in
deciding the extent to which they hedge (Brown et al. 2006). Brown et al. (2006) further find that the
gold producers in their sample are successful in changing hedge ratios in the profitable direction,
suggesting they also have a comparative advantage in predicting future prices.
SFAS 161, effective as of November 2008, requires firms to report gains and losses and fair
values of derivatives by derivative type, accounting designation, and income statement and balance
sheet line item affected. It also requires disclosures of the amount of gains and losses on derivatives
designated as cash flow and net investment hedges included in other comprehensive income (OCI) or
reclassified from OCI to earnings. (Appendix B summarizes disclosure requirements under SFAS 161).
Critics of mandatory derivatives disclosures are concerned that the detailed derivatives and hedging
disclosures may reveal managers’ private information. In a testimony to the Senate Banking, Housing
and Urban Affairs Committee, Hershey’s CEO stated that disclosing gains and losses on cocoa
derivatives contracts would reveal key information to their principal competitors in the confectionery
industry; and may lead to a loss in market share (Wolfe 1997). For example, if Hershey has to disclose
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a loss on cocoa derivatives, competitors would know that Hershey’s cocoa cost is higher, and could
use this information in their pricing and promotions decisions to gain an advantage. In a comment
letter to the ED of SFAS 161, Edison Electric Institute likewise expressed concern with disclosing
proprietary information about forecasted purchases of oil when the forecasted purchase is hedged. If
derivatives disclosures contain proprietary information, competitors may use them to make inferences
about firms’ future performance.
One way that managers can protect their proprietary information in a mandatory disclosure
regime is to reduce or completely eliminate the extent of derivatives use (DeMarzo and Duffie 1995;
Hoang and Ruckes 2013). Indeed, Hershey’s CEO stated that in the face of increased derivatives
disclosures, Hershey was considering other risk management tools (Wolfe 1997). Other executives
made similar claims. For example, in a survey of 319 financial executives by the Treasury Management
Association, 41.7% of respondents indicated that the additional derivatives disclosures proposed by
the SEC would discourage derivatives use to a moderate extent or greater. Therefore, the adoption of
SFAS 161 may result in a reduction in derivatives use. Further, I expect the change in derivatives use
in the post-SFAS 161 period to be significantly greater for HC firms relative to LC firms. The above
discussion leads to the following hypotheses:
H1a: The adoption of SFAS 161 is associated with a decrease in overall derivatives use.
H1b: The adoption of SFAS 161 is associated with a greater decrease in overall derivatives use for HC
firms relative to LC firms.
Furthermore, the adoption of SFAS 161 may create incentives for speculation. Sapra (2002)
analytically shows that mandatory hedge disclosures may deter prudent risk management and induce
managers to take excessive speculative positions in order to influence investors’ perception of the
firm's private information. The intuition behind this finding is as follows. First, managers may acquire
specialized information through their normal operating activities and use this information to take a
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view in the market using derivatives. Prior research shows that managers frequently take derivatives
positions based on their views of future price movements (Bodnar, Hayt, and Marston 1995; Brown
et al. 2006; Beber and Fabbri 2012).
Second, derivatives and hedging disclosures, then, indirectly affect firm value by revealing this
proprietary information. For example, on the same day that gold producer Placer Dome, announced
a decrease in hedging activities, gold prices increased by 10% and the firm’s share prices increased by
24% (Heinzl 2000). Gold prices decreased a few days later when Barrick, another gold producer, did
not decrease hedging activities to the extent expected by the market (Whitman 2000). Anecdotal
evidence suggests that managers are concerned with disclosing information about their market views
through derivatives disclosures. For example, Hershey’s CEO indicated that market participants could
use information about the firm’s cocoa derivatives position to determine both the extent to which
their cocoa needs are hedged and Hershey’s view of the market price direction (Wolfe 1997). Further,
in comment letters to the exposure draft of SFAS 161, a number of respondents expressed concern
about the proprietary or competitive costs of these disclosures.
Third, investors’ response depends upon managers’ disclosures and actions, not upon
managers’ private information. If outsiders use derivatives disclosures to make inferences about
managers’ proprietary information, managers can strategically use derivatives to influence outsiders’
perception of firm value. For example, managers concerned about the value of the firm have incentives
to convey that they have good news about the firm. If derivatives positions are observable, one way
to credibly convey that managers have good news is to take a derivatives position consistent with this
message. In this case, a gold producer may strategically decrease hedging activities to signal some
private information about an increase in future gold price. These derivatives positions are speculative
and should increase firm risk (Guay 1999). Therefore, the real effects of mandatory disclosures here
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come from the interaction of what the managers know and what the market infers from derivatives
disclosures (Kanodia and Sapra 2015).
However, increased derivatives and hedging disclosures allow investors to evaluate firms’ risk
management program using derivatives and the impact of derivatives on financial statements, which
may provide incentives for managers to engage in more prudent risk management practices. Further,
these incentives to increase speculation or for more prudent risk management practices should be
higher for HC firms, as these firms have to increase disclosures to a greater extent in response to the
adoption of SFAS 161. Because the effect of SFAS 161 on speculation is not clear ex ante, I formulate
the following hypotheses in the null form:
H2a: The adoption of SFAS 161 is not associated with a change in the extent of speculative
derivatives.
H2b: The adoption of SFAS 161 is not associated with a change in the extent of speculative derivatives
in a sample of HC firms.
SFAS 161 requires additional disclosures regarding derivatives designated as accounting
hedges relative to non-designated derivatives. For example, in regards to designated derivatives, firms
have to disclose the amount of hedge ineffectiveness, the amount excluded from the assessment of
hedge effectiveness, the fair value of the related hedged items (fair value hedges), the existence of
credit-risk-related contingent features in derivatives, and the aggregate fair value of assets that are
posted as collateral. These additional disclosures may reveal proprietary information. Therefore, if
managers are concerned with disclosing information pertaining to future firm performance or
activities, they may decrease (increase) the extent of designated (non-designated) derivatives. Further,
this effect may be stronger for firms with a higher cost of disclosure.
H3a: The adoption of SFAS 161 is associated with a decrease (increase) in derivatives designated (not
designated) as hedges for accounting purposes.
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H3b: The decrease (increase) in derivatives designated (not designated) as hedges for accounting
purposes following the adoption of SFAS 161 is greater for HC firms relative to LC firms.
Finally, I examine whether designated and non-designated derivatives are effective hedges with
respect to the overall firm exposure and whether their hedge effectiveness changes after the adoption
of SFAS 161. This test complements H2 and H3 and provides further insight into the impact of SFAS
161 on the informativeness of derivatives accounting designation. Hedge effectiveness measures the
extent to which derivatives-related gains and losses offset changes in fair value or cash flows
attributable to the hedged item (FASB 1998). While all designated derivatives are highly effective
hedges of the hedged item, they may not be effective hedges with respect to the firm’s overall exposure
to a specific risk.
Consider the earlier example of the firm with both future revenues and expenses in a foreign
currency, but with a net revenue exposure to the currency. The firm may enter into a derivative
position that is a highly effective hedge of an expense in the foreign currency (e.g., a future purchase
of raw materials) and designate the derivative as a hedge for accounting purposes. However, because
the net exposure of the firm is on the revenue side, this derivative would be speculative with respect
to the overall risk exposure. Similarly, the firm may enter into a derivative that is a highly effective
hedge of a forecasted sale in the foreign currency. While this derivative is a highly effective hedge of
the hedged item, and a hedge with respect to the overall exposure, the firm may choose not to
designate it as an accounting hedge. Therefore, both designated and non-designated derivatives may
be effective hedges of a hedged item, effective hedges of the firm’s net exposure, or speculative with
respect to the overall exposure to the risk being hedged. If firms are more likely to use designated than
non-designated derivatives for hedging purposes, hedge effectiveness will be higher for designated
derivatives. If the accounting designation of derivatives is not informative of derivatives economic
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use, there will not be a significant difference in the hedge effectiveness of designated and non-
designated derivatives.
H4a: There is no difference in the hedge effectiveness of designated and non-designated derivatives.
Further, the adoption of SFAS 161 may result in lower hedge effectiveness for both designated
and non-designated derivatives if firms are more likely to use speculative derivatives in these
categories. In a similar manner, hedge effectiveness of designated and non-designated derivatives will
increase if firms use more hedging derivatives in these categories. The above discussion leads to the
final hypothesis:
H4b: The hedge effectiveness of designated and non-designated derivatives does not change following
the adoption of SFAS 161.
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4. DATA AND SAMPLE SELECTION
For this study, I build an unbalanced panel data set using hand-collected derivatives and
hedging data from 10-K reports. I begin with firms in the Compustat database in the fiscal-year 2001
and exclude (i) financial and regulated firms and (ii) firms with missing data to calculate market
capitalization. Following prior literature, I exclude financial and regulated firms as their financial
reporting is different form non-financial companies (Fauver and Naranjo 2010; Donohoe 2015) and
financial firms are often traders of derivatives rather than end-users. Given the high cost of hand-
collecting data, I restrict my sample to 1,000 non-financial firms with the largest market capitalization
as of 2001, because prior research suggests that larger firms are more likely to use derivatives. I then
focus on a 13-year period starting in fiscal year 2001, after the adoption of SFAS 133. Because SFAS
133 changed both reporting and disclosure requirements for derivatives and hedging activities,
collecting data after its adoption ensures homogenous reporting requirements for the entire period.
My initial sample consists of 1,000 firms and 10,201 firm-year observations. I drop
observations with data not available in Compustat (674), non-user observations (3,053), firms that
initiated derivatives after the adoption of SFAS 161 (90), and firms that stopped using derivatives
before the adoption of SFAS 161 (905). As the purpose of my study is to examine the effect of
mandatory derivatives disclosures on derivatives users, I focus on firms that use derivatives prior to
the adoption of SFAS 161 and continue to use derivatives after the adoption of the standard. My final
sample consists of 496 firms (5,479 firm-year observations) that use derivatives both before and after
the adoption of SFAS 161. Out of this final sample, I use a subsample of 3,012 observations that
disclose the notional amount of derivatives and the prior period notional amount of derivative to
examine the impact of SFAS 161 on the extent of derivatives use and the extent of speculation with
derivatives. Further, I use a subsample of 1,939 observations that disclose the notional amount of
derivatives disaggregated by accounting designation to investigate the impact of SFAS 161 on the
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accounting designation of derivatives. Finally, to examine hedge effectiveness by accounting
designation, I use a subsample of 2,090 observations that disclose the gains and losses on derivatives
disaggregated by accounting designation.
I hand-collect derivatives data related to the extent of derivatives use and derivatives and
hedging disclosures. The extent of derivatives use can be measured by: the notional amount of
derivatives outstanding at end of the period; the total fair value of derivatives contracts at the end of
the period, and the gains and losses on derivatives positions during the year. In my study, I use the
notional amount of derivatives as a proxy for derivatives use for the following reasons. First, using
the notional amount as a proxy for derivatives use provides greater comparability to prior studies, as
it is the most frequently used measure in the literature due to its availability (i.e., Guay 1999; Abdel-
Khalik and Chen 2015; Donohoe 2015). Second, most firms present the notional amount on a gross
basis, while the total fair value of derivatives represents the net amount of derivatives assets and
liabilities, which may understate the extent of derivatives use. Third, disclosure regulation regarding
notional amounts has not changed over the period analyzed.
Table 1 reports descriptive statistics for the derivatives data. Panel A presents the temporal
distribution of the user data by type of risk hedged. Consistent with prior studies, foreign exchange
derivatives are the most common class of derivatives (75.52%), followed by interest rate derivatives
(54.04%), and commodity price derivatives (24.49%) (Bodnar et al. 1996; Nguyen and Faff 2002;
Bartram et al. 2011; Lins et al. 2011). Other studies find that firms use interest rate derivatives to an
equal or greater extent than foreign exchange derivatives (Bodnar, Hayt, and Marston 1998; Guay
1999; Donohoe 2015). Panel B reports the number of firms that disclose the notional amount of
derivatives by fiscal year. On average, 62.31% chose to disclose the notional amount voluntarily, and
the proportion of firms disclosing the notional amount does not change significantly during the period
under study.
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Table 1 Panels C and D illustrate the number of firms that disclose derivatives gains and losses
reported in the income statement and OCI, respectively. I document a widespread variation in
derivatives and hedging disclosures by firms. The number of firms disclosing derivatives gains and
losses increases after 2008. For example, while 82.44% of firms disclose derivatives gains and losses
in the income statement in fiscal 2009, only 26.76% do so voluntarily in fiscal 2007. These changes
are explained by the adoption of SFAS 161 in fiscal years 2009 and 2010, and by an early response to
the proposed regulation in 2008.
I observe that after the adoption of SFAS 161, some firms chose to make fewer disclosures
than appear to be mandated by the standard. This is consistent with prior studies that investigate
mandatory disclosures both in a derivatives (Bhamornsiri and Schroender 2004; Zou 2013) and a non-
derivatives context (Ellies, Fee, and Thomas 2012). This noncompliance may be explained by the high
costs of derivatives disclosures or by the non-materiality of hedging activities. First, if firms consider
the cost of disclosure to be higher than the cost of noncompliance, they may choose to not comply
fully with the requirements of SFAS 161. Second, SFAS 161 requires firms to disclose derivatives
related information if hedging activities are material. If firms do not consider their derivatives use
material, they may not provide all disclosures required by the standard.
To measure the cost of disclosure imposed by SFAS 161, I construct a disclosure score from
data hand-collected from annual reports. I examine the effect of mandatory derivatives disclosures as
required by SFAS 161 on the extent of derivatives use, speculation, and the informativeness of the
accounting designation of derivatives. Therefore, the items selected for inclusion in the score are based
on SFAS 161 disclosures of derivatives gains and losses. I choose to focus on disclosures of gains and
losses, and not on total derivatives disclosures, as prior research and anecdotal evidence suggest that
derivatives gains and losses contain proprietary information and are associated with a high cost of
disclosure (Wolfe 1997; Zou 2013). The finding that only a few firms chose to disclose gains and losses
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voluntarily (compared to the number of firms that disclosed notional amounts and fair values
voluntarily) prior to the adoption of the standard provides further evidence of the potential costs
associated with these disclosures.
Self-constructed disclosure scores have been extensively used in prior studies (Aggarwal and
Simkins 2004; Chalmers and Godfrey 2004; Papa 2010). Following prior literature, I code the
disclosures on a categorical basis and assign a value of one if the relevant disclosure is present, and
zero if applicable, but not disclosed (Chalmers and Godfrey 2004). The measure takes values from
zero to six, where zero represents no disclosure about the impact of derivatives on the income
statement and OCI, and six represents disclosures about these items disaggregated on multiple levels,
as required by SFAS 161. I allocate four of the six points to income statement disclosures: one point
if total derivatives gains and losses are disclosed, and one point for each level of disaggregation (if
gains and losses are presented by type of risk hedged, by accounting designation, and by income
statement line item affected). I also allocate one point if firms disclose the impact of derivatives on
OCI, and one point if that impact is disaggregated between the change in fair value of derivatives
deferred in OCI and amount transferred from OCI to income. The total disclosure score is the sum
of the relevant disclosures made (see Appendix C for more details).
Table 1 Panel E reports descriptive statistics for the disclosure score. As expected, the mean
disclosure score increases with the adoption of SFAS 161 from 1.507 in 2007 to 4.348 in 2009. The
largest changes in the disclosure score occur in 2009 (2.942) and 2010 (2.438), the fiscal years SFAS
161 was adopted. Table 1 Panel F reports the industry distribution of the sample. Manufacturing and
business equipment comprise more than one third of my sample. On the other hand, consumer
durables, manufacturing, and chemicals and allied products have the largest percentage of firms with
a high cost of disclosure. Overall, 24.16% of firms have a high cost of disclosure.
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Table 2 presents the mean notional amount of total derivatives, and the mean notional
amounts of designated and non-designated derivatives as a percentage of lagged total assets, by fiscal
year. The mean notional amount of derivatives, as a percentage of lagged total assets is 14.20%. This
ratio is slightly higher than the one reported in prior studies (Hentschel and Kothari 2001; Graham
and Rogers 2002; Borokhovich, Brunarski, Crutchley, and Smkins 2004; Clark and Mefteh 2010) for
two possible reasons. First, my sample consists of large firms, and larger firms are both more likely to
use derivatives and to use them to a greater extent. Second, my sample is more recent, and the notional
amount of derivatives has been increasing over time. The notional amount of designated derivatives
is higher than the notional amount of non-designated derivatives in all fiscal years presented.
Consistent with my predictions, the notional amount of derivatives and the notional amount of
designated derivatives are statistically lower in fiscal year 2009 than in fiscal year 2007 (p-value 0.053
and 0.004, respectively). The notional amount of non-designated derivatives is statistically higher in
fiscal year 2009 than in fiscal year 2007 (p-value 0.019).
Panels A and B of Figure 1 present the speculative (SPECULATE) and hedging (HEDGE)
components of the notional amount of derivatives over time. The plot reveals an initial increase in the
extent of speculation and a decrease after the adoption of SFAS 161. Both the increase in speculation
and the subsequent decrease are more pronounced for HC firms. Further, HEDGE increases over
time and decreases slightly with the adoption of SFAS 161 for both HC and LC firms.
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5. RESEARCH DESIGN
I first examine whether the adoption of SFAS 161 affects the extent of derivatives use. In this
context, there are two potential sources of sample selection bias: from the decision to use derivatives
and the decision to disclose the notional amount of derivatives. Sample selection bias arises when the
researcher does not observe a random sample of the population of interest. In my study, the
population of interest is the population of derivatives users; therefore, sample selection bias arising
from the decision to use derivatives is not a major concern. However, selectivity bias from the firm’s
decision to voluntarily disclose the notional amount of derivatives is not random and is a concern in
this study. Between 2001 and 2013, firms were not required to disclose the notional amount of
derivatives, but a large proportion did so voluntarily (62%). Observable and unobservable
determinants of the decision to disclose the notional amount of derivatives may affect the relation
between the extent of derivatives use and the adoption of mandatory hedge disclosure rules. If the
sample selection bias is ignored, the coefficients in the second-stage model will be biased. I use
Heckman’s (1979) two-step procedure to control for these factors as it is the standard approach to
correct for selection bias when the choice variable is binary (Tucker 2011; Lennox, Francis, and Wang
2012).
I start by estimating the first stage model, which predicts the decision to disclose the notional
amount of derivatives. Prior empirical literature identifies key incentives that influence the decision to
disclose derivatives-related information (Aggarwal and Simkins 2004; Chalmers and Godfrey 2004;
Papa 2010). This decision is a factor of capital markets and proprietary costs incentives, managerial
risk incentives, size, firm performance, and ownership structure. Therefore, I model a firm’s decision
to disclose the notional amount of derivatives with the following probit model:
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where the dependent variable, NOTIONAL_DISCL, is 1 when the dollar amount of the total notional
amount of derivatives is disclosed, and 0 otherwise2. Prior research and anecdotal evidence suggest
that derivatives disclosures may contain proprietary information. Therefore, I include market share
(MKT_SHARE) as a proxy for proprietary costs and expect a negative association with derivatives
disclosures. I also include the Herfindahl index (HHI) to control for industry competition and expect
a negative relation between the competitiveness of the industry and disclosure. Since managers’ career
concerns may influence the disclosure choice (DeMarzo and Duffie 1995; Papa 2010), I also include
ECSENS, a measure of the sensitivity of executive compensation to firm value (Donohoe 2015), and
predict a negative association with disclosure. Firms using commodity price derivatives are more likely
to disclose the notional amount in units other than dollars, like BTUs or bushels. Therefore, I expect
a negative relation between users of commodity price derivatives (CP_USER) and disclosures of the
notional amount of derivatives.
Because the corporate governance structure can influence the level and quality of disclosure,
I include institutional ownership (INSTOWN) in the model (Chalmers and Godfrey 2004; Papa 2010).
I also include SIZE, ROA, and a dummy that identifies firms audited by the Big 4 (BIGN) as control
variables, as prior research finds that they influence derivatives disclosures (Chalmers and Godfrey
2004; Papa 2010)3. Finally, I include all explanatory variables from the second stage model. I use the
coefficients from Eq. (1) to construct an Inverse Mills ratio (IMR) that I include as a control variable
2 Some firms disclose the notional amount of derivatives in something other than dollars, a foreign currency for foreign
exchange derivatives or bushels for commodity price derivatives. In this case the dependent variable is coded as 0.
3 Prior studies also include leverage, litigation risk and the market-to book ratio as explanatory variables for the decision
to disclose derivatives-related information. When I include these variable, the coefficients are not significant and do not
contribute significantly to the explanatory power of the model. To keep the model parsimonious, I exclude these
variables from the analysis.
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in Eq. (2) and Eq. (3), shown below. IMR is a bias correction term that controls for the effect of
observable and unobservable factors that influence the decision to disclose the notional amount of
derivatives on the relation between the extent of derivatives use and mandatory disclosure rules.
Lennox et al. (2012) argue that a convincing implementation of the Heckman’s procedure
requires the identification of an exogenous independent variable in the first stage model that can be
excluded from the second stage model.  The exclusion variable in my model is CP_USER, an indicator
variable coded 1 for firms that use commodity price derivatives, and 0 otherwise. CP_USER is a good
candidate for an exclusion variable as it is an important determinant of the decision to disclose in the
first stage model, and it is not related to the extent of derivatives use in the second stage model, after
I control for the number of risks hedged. While it is possible to estimate selection models with no
exclusion restrictions, imposing exclusion restrictions is preferable because the selection model is less
likely to suffer from multicollinearity problems (Lennox et al. 2012). Estimated coefficients from the
second stage model yields similar coefficients to the coefficients from the main model Eq. (2) below,
where IMR is excluded.
To examine the association between the adoption of SFAS 161 and the extent of derivatives
use, I follow prior literature (Gay and Nam 1998; Barton 2001; Beber and Fabbri 2012, among others)
and estimate the following OLS regression (variable definitions provided in Appendix A)4:
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where NOTIONAL is the notional amount of derivatives scaled by lagged total assets, and SFAS_161
is an indicator variable equal to 1 for fiscal years beginning after November 15 2008, the effective date
4 I also estimate the model using a Tobit regression on a pooled sample of 3,012 users and 2,598 non-users of
derivatives, with similar results. NOTIONAL is left-censored as it has a value of zero for non-users of derivatives.
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for SFAS 161. COSTD is an indicator variable equal to 1 for firms with a high cost of disclosure, and
zero otherwise. I expect both LC and HC firms to reduce the extent of derivatives use after the
adoption of SFAS 161 (H1a). Therefore I predict 2 will be negative and significant. Because the
effect of the cost of disclosure on the notional amount of derivatives prior to the adoption of SFAS
161 is not evident, I make no prediction for 3 . Furthermore, 4 captures the change in derivatives
use for HC firms, relative to LC firms, after the adoption of SFAS 161. Consistent with H1b, the
coefficient 4 should be negative and significant.
Since firms may enter into derivatives for periods longer than a year, the notional amount of
derivatives, may also reflect derivatives that were entered into previously. Therefore, I include the lag
value of the notional amount of derivatives (LAG_NOTIONAL) to control for the level of derivatives
in the prior period and predict a positive association with derivatives use in the current period. Firms
use derivatives to manage foreign exchange, interest rate, commodity price, and equity price risk, and
a change in the number of risks hedged (CH_USER) should be positively associated with the notional
amount of derivatives. I also include GDP growth (GDP_GROWTH) to control for the influence of
macroeconomic conditions.
RMI is a vector of risk management incentives that are related to derivatives use. Theory
predicts that firms use derivatives to reduce financial distress and bankruptcy costs (Mayers and Smith
1982), agency conflicts of debt and equity (DeMarzo and Duffie 1995; Fok et al. 1997), taxes (Stulz
1996), and information asymmetry. Following Chang et al. (2016), I control for these incentives with
variables that capture the likelihood of financial distress (ALTZ), the likelihood of underinvestment
(USCORE), and the sensitivity of executive compensation to firm value (ECSENS). I also include the
marginal tax rate (MTR) to control for tax incentives. Cash flow volatility (CFV) and earnings volatility
(EV) reflect general incentives to use derivatives (Zhang 2009; Chang et al. 2016). I also control for
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substitutes to derivatives use: preferred stock (PSTOCK) and convertible debt (CDEBT) and risk
exposure (IRISK, FRISK, CRISK).
DIS is a vector of voluntary disclosure incentives. As firms with higher proprietary costs and
firms in more competitive industries are less likely to disclose the notional amount of derivatives, I
control for firms’ market share (MKT_SHARE) and the level of competition (HHI). CTRL is a vector
of control variables that likely influence both the decision to disclose the notional amount of
derivatives and the extent of derivatives use. I control for foreign activity (FI), mergers and acquisitions
(M&A), size (SIZE), and firm profitability (ROA) (Chang et al. 2016). To avoid bias in standard errors
estimates resulting from correlated residual errors in panel data, I follow the recommendation of
Peterson (2009) and report standard errors clustered by firm and fiscal year. To correctly implement
the Heckman (1979) two-stage procedure, I must exclude at least one-stage exogenous independent
variable from the second stage. CP_USER is my exclusion restriction; it is negatively related to the
decision to disclose the notional amount of derivatives, but unrelated to the extent of derivatives use.
Next, I examine whether the adoption of SFAS 161 leads to a change in the extent of
speculative derivatives use. First, I estimate the extent of hedging (HEDGE) and speculation
(SPECULATE) with derivatives. HEDGE is the predicted value from annual cross-sectional
regressions of the notional amount of derivatives on firm characteristics that are associated with
hedging (Eq. 2). SPECULATE is the absolute value of the residual from the same regression. To
calculate HEDGE and SPECULATE, I exclude SFAS_161 and COST_D, as my analysis examines
the differences in the means and medians of HEDGE and SPECULATE between the pre- and post-
SFAS 161 periods for HC and LC firms. This measure has been used in prior studies as a proxy for
speculation and assumes that the portion of the notional amount of derivatives that cannot be
explained by hedging incentives is attributable to speculation (Brown et al. 2006; Beber and Fabbri
2012). It accounts for the amount of over- or under-hedging in the period. I expect a significant
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increase (decrease) in SPECULATE after the adoption of SFAS 161 if firms are more speculative
(prudent) after the adoption of mandatory hedge disclosures (H2a). Further, I expect a significant
increase (decrease) in SPECULATE after the adoption of SFAS 161 for HC firms due to their higher
cost of adopting mandatory hedge disclosures (H2b). I do not make any predictions for the hedging
component (HEDGE), as theory is silent regarding this component of derivatives.
To test H3a and H3b, I examine the association between mandatory derivatives and hedge
disclosures and the extent of derivatives designated and not designated as accounting hedges by
estimating the following OLS regressions (variable definitions provided in Appendix A5):
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where NOTIONAL_D (NOTIONAL_ND) are the notional amount of derivatives designated (not
designated) as accounting hedges, scaled by lagged total assets. All other variables are as defined above.
I predict that the adoption of SFAS 161 is associated with a decrease (increase) in the extent of
derivatives designated (not designated) as accounting hedges (H3a). I expect the coefficient 2 to be
negative (positive) and significant when the dependent variable is the notional amount of designated
(non-designated) derivatives. The coefficient 4 captures the effect of the adoption of SFAS 161 on
the extent of designated and non-designated derivatives for HC firms, relative to LC firms. I expect
the coefficient 4 to be negative (positive) and significant when the dependent variable is the notional
amount of designated (non-designated) derivatives (H3b). Because the impact of the cost of disclosure
5 The results do not change if I model the equation as a Tobit regression rather than OLS. Out of the 1,939
observations, 434 and 898 are left-censored when the dependent variables are NOTIONAL_D and NOTIONAL_ND,
respectively.
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(COSTD) on the accounting designation of derivatives prior to the adoption of SFAS 161 is not clear,
I make no predictions for 3 .
Finally, I examine whether the accounting designation of derivatives is informative of
derivatives economic use and whether the adoption of SFAS 161 changes the hedge effectiveness of
designated and non-designated derivatives. An ideal measure of the effectiveness of derivatives would
consider the extent to which changes in the fair value of derivatives in fair value hedges offset changes
in the fair value of firm net assets due to the risk being hedged and the extent to which changes in the
fair value of derivatives in cash flow hedges offset firm’s cash flows attributable to the risk hedged
(i.e. foreign currency risk). However, such detailed information about derivatives and hedged items is
not readily available. Therefore, I use pretax earnings before derivatives gains and losses as a proxy of
cash flows and changes in fair value of net assets due to the risks the firm is exposed to, and I use
pretax derivatives gains and losses as a proxy of the change in fair value of derivatives during the
period. I create a measure of overall hedge effectiveness, as the extent to which derivatives gains and
losses offset gains and losses before taxes and before derivatives.
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where NIBD is pretax net income before derivatives gains and losses, NI is pretax net income, and
DERD_GL (DERND_GL) are the gains/losses related to designated (not designated) derivatives. All
continuous variables are scaled by lagged total assets. I expect LAG_NI to be positively related to
gains and losses before derivatives, but make no prediction for the effect of the adoption of SFAS
161 on pretax earnings ( 5 ). If firms use derivatives for hedging purposes, the derivatives gains and
losses should offset gains and losses before derivatives and should be negatively related. If, on the
other hand, derivatives are used for speculative purposes, the derivatives gains and losses may be either
positively or negatively related to gains and losses before derivatives. Since both designated and non-
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designated derivatives may be used for both speculative and hedging purposes, I make no predictions
regarding the sign of the coefficients 3 and 4 . Further, I make no predictions for the coefficients 6
and 7 since the adoption of SFAS 161 may lead to an increase or decrease in the extent of speculative
derivatives in each category (H4).
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6. RESULTS
Descriptive statistics
Table 3 reports descriptive statistics for measures of risk management incentives, voluntary
disclosure incentives, and control variables, along with t-statistics for mean tests of differences
between firms with a high and low cost of disclosure. Descriptive statistics suggest that LC and HC
firms differ across several dimensions. Relative to LC firms, HC firms have significantly higher market
share (MKT_SHARE), suggesting that HC firms have higher proprietary costs than LC firms. HC
firms also have a higher probability of bankruptcy (ALTZ), higher underinvestment risk (USCORE),
and lower sensitivity of executive compensation to firm value (ECSENS). Finally, HC firms have a
greater proportion of foreign income (FI) and are more likely to be audited by a big 4 audit firm
(BIGN) than LC firms.
Effect of SFAS 161 on the extent of derivatives used
Table 4 reports the results of estimating the first stage model (Eq. 1). The area under the ROC
curve is 0.76, suggesting that the model has fair discriminatory power and the coefficients are generally
consistent with prior research and predictions. For example, disclosure of notional amounts is
negatively associated with industry competition (HHI), and the choice to use commodity price
derivatives (CP_USER), and positively associated with the percentage of institutional ownership
(INSTOWN). Further, the decision to disclose the notional amount of derivatives is positively
associated with bankruptcy (ALTZ) and underinvestment risk (USCORE) and negatively associated
with risk exposure (IRIS, CRISK). Finally, firms are more likely to disclose the notional amount of
derivatives after the adoption of SFAS 161. The results imply that, compared to firms that disclose
the notional, firms that do not disclose the notional amount operate in industries with more intense
competition, have higher risk exposures and have lower monitoring. I use the coefficients from Eq.
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(1) to construct an inverse Mills Ratio (IMR) that I then include in Eq. (2) and Eq. (3) to control for
selection bias.
Table 5 reports the results of estimating Eq. (2), where I regress the notional amount of
derivatives (NOTIONAL) on: a) a dummy variable that identifies fiscal years after the adoption of
SFAS 161 (SFAS_161); b) a binary variable that captures the cost of disclosure associated with SFAS
161 (COSTD); c) the interaction between SFAS 161 and COSTD; and d) a number of firm
characteristics that are associated with the extent of derivatives use. The main effect of SFAS 161 is
not statistically significant (H1a), suggesting that overall, the extent of derivatives use is not different
after the adoption of SFAS 161. However, I find that relative to LC firms, HC firms significantly
reduce the extent of derivatives used after the adoption of SFAS 161. The coefficient for the
interaction term (-0.011), representing the difference between the change in the extent of derivatives
use for LC firms and the change in the extent of derivatives use for HC firms, is negative and
significant. An F-test also indicates that the change in the extent of derivatives use for HC firms is
significantly negative (p-value=0.05) (H1b).
The difference in the extent of derivatives use between the two periods for high cost firms is
also economically significant as it suggests that the notional amount of derivatives after SFAS 161 is
about 7.82% lower than before SFAS 161 was adopted. The average decrease in the extent of
derivatives use for high cost firms is $113.54 million, and the aggregate decrease for the sample of
firms with a high cost of disclosure is $43.48 billion. The upper bound for the average and aggregate
reduction in the extent of derivatives use, calculated using the 95% confidence interval, are $327.05
million and $125.26 billion, respectively.
The coefficient for the proprietary cost proxy (COSTD) is positive and significant, while the
coefficient for the interaction between COSTD and SFAS_161 is negative and significant. These
results suggest that firms with a high cost of disclosure use derivatives to a greater extent than firms
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with a low cost of disclosures prior to the adoption of SFAS 161, but an F test reveals that the
difference is not significant after the adoption of the standard. This finding is in line with the argument
made by Demarzo and Duffie (1991) that if firms have proprietary information, shareholders may not
have enough information to adopt financial strategies. Therefore, firms may hedge on their behalf
when hedging choices are not disclosed. However, if hedging choices are disclosed, these disclosures
may reveal proprietary information, in which case the incentive to hedge on behalf of the shareholders
is reduced.
The coefficients for the control variables are generally consistent with prior studies. The
notional amount of derivatives is associated with hedging incentives, like the probability of bankruptcy
(ALTZ) and underinvestment risk (USCORE). Further, the results suggest that firms with higher
foreign income (FI) and more profitable firms (ROA) use derivatives to a greater extent. Finally,
derivatives use is also associated with industry competition (HHI) and institutional ownership
(INSTOWN).
Effect of SFAS 161 on the extent of speculative derivatives
Panels A and B of Table 6 report the results from the tests of differences in means (t-test) and
medians (Wilcoxon rank-sum test), respectively, in the hedging (HEDGE) and speculative
(SPECULATE) components of the notional amount of derivatives between the pre- and post-SFAS
161 periods. I do not find support for H2a, as the extent of speculation does not decrease significantly
in the post-SFAS 161 period. However, consistent with more prudent risk management practices
following mandatory derivatives disclosures for HC firms, I find that HC firms significantly reduce
the extent of speculation with derivatives after the adoption of SFAS 161 (t-stat 2.355; z-stat 2.633)
(H2b).
Further, the hedging component of derivatives (HEDGE) is not significantly different
between the two periods for HC firms. However, the difference in medians of HEDGE between the
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pre- and post-SFAS 161 periods for LC firms is significantly positive, while the difference in means is
not. These results provide weak evidence of a decrease in the extent of hedging derivatives for LC
firms following the adoption of SFAS 161. One explanation for this finding is that LC firms are
changing how they account for derivatives, and using less designated and more non-designated
derivatives. These accounting changes may also involve de-designating or terminating derivatives in
hedging relations. Since the accounting designation of derivatives is related to their economic use,
firms may be terminating some hedging derivatives after the adoption of SFAS 161. This may explain
the weak decrease in hedging derivatives observed.
Effect of SFAS 161 on the accounting designation of derivatives
Table 7 reports the results of estimating Eq. (3), where the dependent variable is the notional
amount of designated derivatives (NOTIONAL_D) in the first column and the notional amount of
non-designated derivatives (NOTIONAL_ND) in the second column. When the dependent variable
is the notional amount of designated derivatives, the estimated coefficients for SFAS 161 (-0.011) and
the interaction between SFAS 161 and COSTD (-0.037) are negative and statistically significant. These
results indicate that the use of derivatives designated as accounting hedges is lower after the adoption
of SFAS 161 for both HC and LC firms. Further HC firms reduce designated derivatives use to a
greater extent than LC firms after the adoption of mandatory derivatives disclosures. In the second
column, the estimated coefficients for SFAS_161 (0.016) and the interaction between SFAS 161 and
COSTD (0.021) are positive and statistically significant, suggesting that the extent of derivatives not
designated as accounting hedges is higher for both HC and LC firms after the adoption of SFAS 161.
However, relative to LC firms, HC firms increase their use of non-designated derivatives after the
adoption of SFAS 161 to a greater extent than LC firms. The results are consistent with my hypothesis
that firms use more non-designated and fewer designated derivatives after the adoption fi SFAS 161
to reduce the cost of disclosure imposed by the standard.
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The difference in the extent of designated and non-designated derivatives use between the two
periods for LC and HC firms is also economically significant. For example, LC (HC) firms reduce
designated derivatives use by 13% (32%) and increase the extent to which they use non-designated
derivatives by 41% (179%). The average decrease in the extent of designated derivatives use for LC
(HC) firms is $94.69 million ($288.93 million), and the aggregate decrease for the sample is $136.94
billion. Similarly, the average increase in the extent of non-designated derivatives use for LC (HC)
firms $132.60 million ($222.26 million), and the aggregate increase for the sample is $148.37 billion.
Further, the coefficient for COSTD is positive and significant in the first column, and negative
and significant in the second column. This is consistent with the idea that firms with high proprietary
costs act on behalf of the shareholders and hedge, not speculate when the hedging choices are not
disclosed. As expected, the notional amount of derivatives designated as accounting hedges is related
to firm characteristics that theory suggests are associated with hedging derivatives: the sensitivity of
executives’ compensation to firm value (ECSENS) and the marginal tax rate (MTR). The notional
amount of non-designated derivatives is not significantly associated with hedging incentives. These
results suggest that firms are more likely to use designated derivatives for hedging purposes.
Effect of SFAS 161 on hedge effectiveness
Table 8 reports the results from estimating Eq. (4), where the dependent variable is net income
before taxes and derivatives. As expected, the gains and losses for derivatives designated as accounting
hedges are negatively related to net income before derivatives gains (p<0.01), implying they are
effective hedges of the firms’ overall exposure. While the coefficient for gains and losses for non-
designated derivatives is also negative, it is not statistically significant. This suggests that derivatives
designated as accounting hedges are more likely to be used as hedging derivatives (H4a). The
coefficient of the interaction term DERD_GL*SFAS_161 (0.002), representing the difference in
hedge effectiveness of designated derivatives before and after the adoption of SFAS 161, is positive
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and significant, indicating that the hedge effectiveness of designated derivatives decreased after the
adoption of SFAS 161 (H4b). An F-test indicates that while hedge effectiveness decreases, designated
derivatives are still effective hedges of firms’ overall exposure after the adoption of SFAS 161 (p-
value=0.05). This implies that while designated derivatives are highly effective hedges with respect to
a financial statement item, and effective hedges with respect to the overall exposure of the firm, they
are less effective after the adoption of SFAS 161.
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7. CONCLUSION
In my study, I evaluate the effect of mandatory derivatives disclosures on overall derivatives
use, speculation with derivatives, and derivatives accounting designation. Theory predicts that firms
may respond to mandatory derivatives and hedge disclosures by reducing the extent of derivatives use
and increasing speculation with derivatives (Sapra 2002; Hoang and Ruckes 2013). SFAS 161
significantly expands disclosure requirements for derivatives and hedging activities and provides a
setting to test these theoretical predictions. Because SFAS 161 requires fewer disclosures for non-
designated derivatives, I also predict that firms will use fewer designated derivatives and more non-
designated derivatives after the adoption of SFAS 161. I find that high disclosure cost (HC) firms
reduce both the extent of derivatives use and the extent of speculative derivatives after the adoption
of SFAS 161. Further, I find that both HC and low disclosure cost (LC) firms reduce (increase) the
extent of designated (non-designated) derivatives, but the changes are more pronounced for HC firms.
These findings are consistent with the view that disclosures of designated derivatives impose a higher
proprietary cost for firms than disclosures of non-designated derivatives. Finally, I find that the
accounting designation of derivatives is informative of their economic use, however, it is less
informative after the adoption of SFAS 161.
Therefore, my results suggest that mandatory derivatives and hedge disclosures have real
effects on how firms use derivatives and on the extent of speculation, and accounting effects on
derivatives accounting designation. The findings in this study also present opportunities for future
research. Future studies may investigate what factors determine the decision to designate derivatives
for accounting purposes and how the market responds to this decision.
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FIGURES AND TABLES
FIGURE 1
Panel A: Speculation over time
Panel B: Hedging over time
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TABLE 1
Descriptive statistics – derivatives
Panel A: Temporal distribution of user observations, by risk exposure hedged
Fiscal year User FX user IR user CP user
2001 379 271 215 81
2002 385 277 226 86
2003 404 292 248 90
2004 417 298 254 90
2005 416 313 224 94
2006 419 321 219 102
2007 442 332 246 106
2008 457 349 237 122
2009 468 352 257 125
2010 450 346 239 118
2011 429 340 221 118
2012 419 334 200 111
2013 394 313 175 99
Total 5,479 4,138 2,961 1,342
Panel A reports the temporal distribution of different types of derivatives users. A firm is a User in
fiscal year t if it reports a position in derivatives at the end of that fiscal year. A firm is a FX user, IR
user, or CP user in fiscal year t if it reports a position in foreign exchange, interest rate, or commodity
price derivatives at the end of that fiscal year.
Panel B: Number of firms with notional amounts disclosed, by fiscal year
Fiscal year Total Designated/non-
designated
% Total disclosed
2001 229 117 60.58
2002 225 114 58.59
2003 239 130 59.16
2004 247 136 59.38
2005 243 130 58.41
2006 238 131 56.80
2007 252 154 57.14
2008 278 191 60.83
2009 315 233 67.45
2010 306 226 68.00
2011 291 213 67.83
2012 280 211 66.83
2013 268 196 68.02
Total 3,411 2,182 62.31
The first column in Panel B shows the number of firms that disclose the notional amount of
derivatives by fiscal year. The second column shows the number of firms that disclose the notional
amount of derivatives by accounting designation. The third column shows the percentage of firms
that report the notional amount of derivatives.
42
TABLE 1 (continued)
Panel C: Number of firms with gains/losses disclosed, by fiscal year
Fiscal year Total By risk hedged Designated/non-
designated
By line item % Total disclosed
2001 44 35 21 16 11.64
2002 54 43 28 24 14.06
2003 56 43 28 24 13.86
2004 61 46 32 30 14.66
2005 64 53 36 35 15.38
2006 80 68 48 45 19.09
2007 118 104 87 79 26.76
2008 209 197 185 164 45.73
2009 385 372 365 345 82.44
2010 371 360 350 327 82.44
2011 354 344 334 315 82.52
2012 344 336 326 305 82.10
2013 321 314 306 285 81.47
Total 2,461 2,315 2,146 1,994 44.96
The first column in Panel C reports the number of firms that disclose the gains and losses related to
derivatives by fiscal year. The second column reports the number of firms that disclose the gains and
losses related to derivatives by risk hedged. The third column reports the number of firms that disclose
the gains and losses related to derivatives by accounting designation. The fourth column reports the
number of firms that disclose the gains and losses related to derivatives by income statement line item
affected. The fifth column reports the percentage of firms that disclose total derivatives gains and
losses.
Panel D: Number of firms with OCI derivatives data disclosed, by fiscal year
Fiscal year Net impact on OCI Deferred and Transferred
2001 182 80
2002 192 83
2003 205 88
2004 217 102
2005 229 110
2006 233 114
2007 260 139
2008 288 180
2009 328 279
2010 317 273
2011 311 268
2012 307 264
2013 278 245
Total 3,347 2,225
The first column in Panel D reports the number of firms that disclose the net derivatives gains and
losses included in OCI by fiscal year. The second column reports the number of firms that disclose
amounts deferred in OCI and transferred from OCI to earnings for derivatives in cash flow hedges.
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TABLE 1 (continued)
Panel E: Disclosure score and change in disclosure score by fiscal year
Fiscal year Mean disclosure score Change in disclosure score
2001 0.997 .
2002 1.096 0.142
2003 1.099 0.218
2004 1.168 0.190
2005 1.257 0.220
2006 1.322 0.194
2007 1.507 0.330
2008 2.018 0.820
2009 4.348 2.942
2010 4.371 2.438
2011 4.434 0.159
2012 4.444 0.074
2013 4.388 0.028
Panel E reports descriptive statistics for the disclosure score and for the change in disclosure score, a
self-constructed score based on the extent of derivatives disclosures. See Appendix C for details on
the construction of the disclosure score.
Panel F: Industry distribution of sample observations
Fama-French 12 industries USERS DISCL_COST=0 % DISCL_COST=1 %
Consumer Non-Durables 502 414 82.47 88 17.53
Consumer Durables 240 126 52.50 114 47.50
Manufacturing 936 625 66.77 311 33.23
Energy & Extraction 366 314 85.79 52 14.21
Chemicals & Allied Products 362 216 59.67 146 40.33
Business Equipment 1,251 1,017 81.29 234 18.71
Telecommunications 210 172 81.90 38 18.10
Wholesale & Retail 580 463 79.83 117 20.17
Healthcare 468 341 72.86 127 27.14
Contr., Transport & Services 564 467 82.80 97 17.20
Total 5,479 4,155 75.84 1,324 24.16
Panel F reports the industry distribution of derivatives users and the industry distribution of
derivatives users by derivatives disclosure cost.
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TABLE 2
Notional amount of derivatives, by fiscal year and hedge designation
Fiscal year Total derivatives Designated derivatives Non-designated derivatives
2001 0.132 0.096 0.024
2002 0.132 0.087 0.029
2003 0.143 0.103 0.030
2004 0.133 0.095 0.027
2005 0.134 0.092 0.030
2006 0.152 0.107 0.032
2007 0.166 0.111 0.035
2008 0.151 0.097 0.042
2009 0.141 0.081 0.052
2010 0.159 0.093 0.055
2011 0.141 0.083 0.050
2012 0.133 0.073 0.052
2013 0.126 0.072 0.051
Total 0.142 0.090 0.042
The first column of Table 2 reports the notional amount of total derivatives as a percentage of lagged
total assets by fiscal year. Columns 2 and 3 present the notional amount of total designated and non-
designated derivatives as a percentage of lagged total assets by fiscal year.
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TABLE 3
Descriptive statistics
DISCL_COST=0 DISCL_COST =1
VARIABLE Obs Mean Std Dev Obs Mean Std Dev t-stat
RISK MANAGEMENT INCENTIVES
ALTZ 4,155 3.463 2.911 1,324 3.302 2.542 1.8003
USCORE 4,155 0.371 0.186 1,324 0.389 0.173 -3.107
ECSENS 4,155 0.993 2.678 1,324 0.679 1.745 4.001
MTR 4,155 0.301 0.103 1,324 0.301 0.104 -0.080
CFV 4,155 0.560 0.866 1,324 0.525 0.784 1.313
EV 4,155 1.817 4.546 1,324 1.707 4.771 0.759
PSTOCK 4,155 0.002 0.013 1,324 0.001 0.007 3.699
CDEBT 4,155 0.027 0.072 1,324 0.023 0.067 1.785
FRISK 4,155 0.013 0.013 1,324 0.013 0.013 1.626
IRISK 4,155 0.002 0.003 1,324 0.002 0.003 0.799
CRISK 4,155 0.013 0.013 1,324 0.012 0.012 2.465
VOLUNTARY DISCLOSURE INCENTIVES
MKT_SHARE 4,155 0.190 0.238 1,324 0.211 0.271 -2.651
HHI 4,155 -0.096 0.079 1,324 -0.095 0.075 -0.707
CONTROLS
FI 4,155 0.035 0.046 1,324 0.040 0.048 -3.400
BIGN 4,155 0.975 0.155 1,324 0.992 0.087 -3.810
MA 4,155 0.562 0.496 1,324 0.606 0.489 -2.790
SIZE 4,155 8.580 1.338 1,324 8.520 1.168 1.461
ROA 4,155 0.020 0.025 1,324 0.021 0.024 -1.214
INSTOWN 4,155 0.658 0.300 1,324 0.649 0.300 1.040
IMR 4,155 0.642 0.419 1,324 0.678 0.403 -2.730
Table 3 reports descriptive statistics for firms with a low and high cost of disclosing derivatives related
information (DISCL_COST=0, DISCL_COST=1). Bold t-statistics denote significance at 0.10 (two-
tailed) for mean tests of differences between firms with a high and low cost of derivatives disclosures.
All continuous variables are winsorized at 1st and 99th percentile. All variables are defined in Appendix
A.
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TABLE 4
First stage model
NOTIONAL_DISCL
Exp. Coeff. RSE
MKT_SHARE - -0.168 0.292
HHI - -0.660 ** 0.378
ECSENS +/- 0.006 0.013
CP_USER - -1.148 *** 0.127
INSTOWN + 0.202 * 0.162
SIZE +/- -0.081 0.041
ROA +/- 0.596 1.797
BIGN + -0.013 0.283
SFAS_161 +/- 0.250 *** 0.074
COSTD + 0.047 0.114
ALTZ +/- -0.038 * 0.021
USCORE +/- 0.498 ** 0.235
MTR +/- -0.034 0.238
CFV +/- -0.050 0.043
EV +/- -0.010 * 0.005
PSTOCK +/- -0.003 2.751
CDEBT +/- -0.817 0.594
FI +/- 1.563 1.033
FRISK +/- 0.639 2.083
IRISK +/- -15.071 * 8.958
CRISK +/- -4.191 ** 2.185
MA +/- 0.070 0.071
GDP +/- -0.668 1.117
INTERCEPT +/- 1.119 ** 0.479
Industry FF Included
Pseudo R2 18.40%
Area under ROC curve 0.76
Observations 5,479
This table reports results of estimating the first stage model (Eq. (1)) using a probit regression, where
the dependent variable (NOTIONAL_DISCL) is coded 1 for firms that disclose the notional amount
of derivatives, and 0 otherwise. *, **, and *** denote statistical significance levels of 0.10, 0.05, and
0.01, respectively (two-tailed for non-signed and one tailed for signed tests). Robust standard errors
(RSE) are clustered by firm. All variables are defined in Appendix A.
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TABLE 5
Effect of the adoption of SFAS 161 on the extent of derivatives used
NOTIONAL
Exp Coeff. RSE
SFAS_161 - -0.002 0.006
COSTD +/- 0.014 *** 0.003
COSTD*SFAS_161 - -0.011 ** 0.006
CH_USER + 0.048 *** 0.006
LAG_NOTIONAL + 0.748 *** 0.026
ALTZ - -0.002 ** 0.001
USCORE + 0.023 *** 0.008
ECSENS + 0.000 0.001
MTR + 0.011 0.018
CFV +/- -0.003 0.003
EV +/- 0.000 0.000
PSTOCK - 0.543 * 0.298
CDEBT - 0.074 ** 0.037
FI +/- 0.141 *** 0.036
FRISK +/- 0.098 0.148
IRISK +/- 1.163 0.716
CRISK +/- 0.005 0.158
MKT_SHARE +/- 0.002 0.010
HHI + 0.026 *** 0.008
BIGN +/- -0.019 0.014
MA +/- -0.014 *** 0.002
SIZE + 0.001 0.001
ROA +/- 0.204 * 0.116
INSTOWN +/- -0.023 ** 0.011
GDP_GROWTH +/- 0.140 0.098
IMR +/- -0.016 ** 0.008
INTERCEPT +/- 0.062 *** 0.023
Adjusted R2 60.04%
Observations 3,012
F-test: SFAS_161+COSTD*SFAS_161=0 3.19 **
This table reports results of estimating Eq. (2) using an OLS regression, where the dependent variable
is the notional amount of derivatives (NOTIONAL). *, **, and *** denote statistical significance levels
of 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01, respectively (two-tailed for non-signed and one tailed for signed tests). Robust
standard errors (RSE) are clustered by firm and fiscal year (Petersen 2009). All variables are defined
in Appendix A.
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TABLE 6
Change in hedging and speculation after the adoption of SFAS 161
Panel A: Mean difference tests
HEDGE SPECULATE
HC LC HC LC
Pre-SFAS 161 0.160 (383) 0.141 (1,292) 0.066 (383) 0.056 (1,292)
Post-SFAS 161 0.160 (337) 0.135 (1,000) 0.054 (337) 0.055 (1,000)
t-test -0.039 1.289 2.355 0.161
p-value 0.019
Panel B: Median difference tests
HEDGE SPECULATE
HC LC HC LC
Pre-SFAS 161 0.128 (383) 0.106 (1,292) 0.041 (383) 0.037 (1,292)
Post-SFAS 161 0.137 (337) 0.100 (1,000) 0.033 (337) 0.035 (1,000)
z-test 0.832 2.090 2.663 0.889
p-value 0.037 0.008
This table reports the tests of differences in means (t-tests) and medians (Wilcoxon rank-sum test) in
the hedging and speculative components of the notional amount of derivatives between the pre- and
post-SFAS 161 periods. HEDGE is the predicted value from annual cross-sectional regressions of the
notional amount of derivatives on firm fundamentals. SPECULATE is the absolute value of the
residuals from the same regression. The number of observations in each category is reported in
parentheses. All variables are defined in Appendix A.
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TABLE 7
Effect of the adoption of SFAS 161 on the accounting designation of derivatives
NOTIONAL_D NOTIONAL_ND
Exp Coeff. RSE Coeff. RSE
SFAS_161 +/- -0.011 *** 0.005 0.016 *** 0.004
COSTD +/- 0.050 *** 0.011 -0.025 *** 0.008
COSTD*SFAS_161 +/- -0.037 *** 0.011 0.021 *** 0.009
CH_USER + 0.036 *** 0.007 0.009 *** 0.002
LAG_NOTIONAL +/- 0.396 *** 0.046 0.226 *** 0.031
ALTZ - -0.002 0.002 0.001 0.001
USCORE + 0.035 0.030 -0.001 0.021
ECSENS + 0.002 * 0.001 0.000 0.001
MTR + 0.042 *** 0.016 -0.019 0.014
CFV +/- -0.001 0.005 0.000 0.003
EV +/- 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
PSTOCK - 0.322 0.427 -0.001 0.142
CDEBT - -0.054 0.048 0.050 0.041
FI +/- 0.146 0.117 0.045 0.111
FRISK +/- 0.093 0.193 0.038 0.163
IRISK +/- 0.517 0.656 0.856 * 0.475
CRISK +/- -0.079 0.183 -0.027 0.135
MKT_SHARE +/- 0.025 0.017 -0.008 0.014
HHI + 0.038 0.023 0.007 0.018
BIGN +/- -0.005 0.018 -0.010 0.018
MA +/- -0.009 * 0.005 0.000 0.004
SIZE + 0.005 * 0.003 -0.002 0.003
ROA +/- -0.085 0.161 0.062 0.188
INSTOWN +/- -0.006 0.015 -0.011 0.011
GDP_GROWTH +/- 0.390 *** 0.109 -0.186 *** 0.053
IMR +/- 0.000 0.014 -0.005 0.009
INTERCEPT +/- -0.022 0.036 0.053 0.035
Adjusted R2 36.24% 21.83%
Observations 1,939 1,939
This table reports results of estimating Eq. (3) using an OLS regression, where the dependent variable
is the notional amount of designated derivatives (NOTIONAL_D) in the first column, and the
notional amount of non-designated derivatives (NOTIONAL_ND) in the second column. *, **, and
*** denote statistical significance levels of 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01, respectively (two-tailed for non-signed
and one tailed for signed tests). Robust standard errors (RSE) are clustered by firm and fiscal year
(Petersen 2009). All variables are defined in Appendix A.
50
TABLE 8
Effect of the adoption of SFAS 161 on hedge effectiveness
NIBD
Exp. Coeff. RSE
LAG_NI + 0.61876 *** 0.06386
DERD_GL - -0.00217 *** 0.00036
DERND_GL - -0.00026 0.00078
SFAS_161 +/- 0.02608 ** 0.01070
DERD_GL *SFAS_161 +/- 0.00152 ** 0.00061
DERND_GL *SFAS_161 +/- 0.00016 0.00085
INTERCEPT +/- 0.01174 0.01116
Adjusted R2 43.42%
Observations 2,090
F-test: DERD_GL + DERD_GL *SFAS_161=0 3.40 **
This table reports results of estimating Eq. (4) using an OLS regression, where the dependent variable
is net income before taxes and before derivatives gains and losses (NIBD). *, **, and *** denote
statistical significance levels of 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01, respectively (two-tailed for non-signed and one
tailed for signed tests). Robust standard errors (RSE) are clustered by fiscal year. All variables are
defined in Appendix A.
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APPENDIX A – VARIABLE DEFINITIONS
Derivatives variables
USER Indicator variable equal to 1 if the firm uses derivatives at year t, and 0
otherwise. Hand-collected from Form 10-K.
CP_USER Indicator variable equal to 1 if the firm uses commodity price derivatives at
year t, and 0 otherwise. Hand-collected from Form 10-K.
CH_USER Change in the number of risks hedged (interest rate risk, foreign exchange
risk, commodity price risk). Hand-collected from Form 10-K.
NOTIONAL Notional value of derivatives designated as accounting hedges divided by
lagged total assets (at). Hand-collected from Form 10-K.
NOTIONAL_D Notional value of derivatives designated as accounting hedges divided by
lagged total assets (at). Hand-collected from Form 10-K.
NOTIONAL_ND Notional value of derivatives not designated as accounting hedges divided by
lagged total assets (at). Hand-collected from Form 10-K.
HEDGE Predicted value of the hedging component from the regression of the
notional amount of derivatives on firm fundamentals.
SPECULATE The absolute value of the residual from a regression of the notional amount
of derivatives on fundamentals. See Beber and Fabbri (2012).
NI Income before taxes (pi) divided by lagged total assets (at).
NIBD Income before taxes (pi) less derivatives gains and losses (hand-collected
from Form 10-K), divided by lagged total assets (at).
DER_GL Derivatives gains and losses, divided by lagged total assets (at). Hand-
collected from Form 10-K.
DERD_GL Designated derivatives gains and losses, divided by lagged total assets (at).
Hand-collected from Form 10-K.
DERND_GL Non-designated derivatives gains and losses, divided by lagged total assets
(at). Hand-collected from Form 10-K.
DISCL Self-constructed measure based on the level of derivatives disclosures in
Form 10-K. Takes values from zero to six. Hand-collected from Form 10-K.
See Appendix C for details. (Chalmers and Godfrey 2004).
CH_DISCL Change in disclosure level (DISCL) from year t-2 to year t.
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Derivatives variables (continued)
COSTD Coded 1 for firms that have to make a large change in disclosure levels (>4)
(HC) in the fiscal year SFAS 161 is adopted and 0 otherwise (LC). The firms
coded 1 are in the top 25th percentile.
SFAS_161 Indicator variable equal to 1 for fiscal years beginning after November 15
2008, the effective date for SFAS 161.
Risk management incentives
ALTZ Likelihood of entering financial distress, defined as the modified Altman-Z
score based on parameter weights reported by Shumway (2001). See
Donohoe (2015).
USCORE Likelihood of underinvestment, defined by first ranking cash flow from
operations (oancf), debt-to-assets ratio (lt/at), and scores from a factor
analysis of four growth opportunity measures (prior investment activity,
geometric growth in market value of assets, market-to- book ratio, and
research and development expense) into deciles by year and industry. Decile
ranks for debt-to- asset ratios and growth opportunity factor scores are then
added to the reverse decile rank for cash flow from operations, with the
result scaled by 30 (total possible points). See Donohoe (2015).
ECSENS Sensitivity of executive compensation to firm value, defined by first
computing the dollar change in value of CEO stock and option holdings
that would result from a one percentage point increase in the stock price of
the firm (0.01*prcc_f*[shrown_tot+opt_unex_exer_num]). The result is
then normalized by the sum of CEO salary and bonus (salary+bonus) to
capture the share of total CEO compensation that would result from a one
percentage point increase in firm value. Compensation data obtained from
Execucomp. See Donohoe (2015).
MTR Marginal tax rate. See Blouin, Core, and Guay (2010).
EV Earnings volatility, defined as the standard deviation of earnings before
extraordinary items (ib) during the most recent five years scaled by the
absolute value of the mean of earnings before extraordinary items over the
same five-year period.
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Risk management incentives (continued)
CFV Cash flow volatility, defined as the standard deviation of operating cash
flows (oancf) during the most recent five years scaled by the absolute value
of the mean of operating cash flows over the same five-year period.
PSTOCK Preferred stock, defined as preferred stock (pstk) divided by lagged total
assets (at).
CDEBT Convertible debt, defined as convertible debt (dcvt) divided by lagged total
assets (at).
Risk exposure variables
IRISK Interest rate risk exposure, defined as the absolute value of the coefficient
from a regression of firms’ monthly holding period stock returns on the
monthly percentage change in the London Interbank Offered Rate (LIBOR)
for 24 months prior to fiscal-year end. See Guay (1999), Zhang (2009), and
Donohoe (2015).
FRISK Foreign currency exchange rate risk exposure, defined as the absolute value
of the estimated coefficient from a regression of firms’ monthly holding
period stock returns on the monthly percentage change in the Federal
Reserve Board trade-weighted U.S. dollar index for 24 months prior to
fiscal-year end. See Guay (1999), Zhang (2009), and Donohoe (2015).
CRISK Commodity price risk exposures, defined as the absolute value of the
estimated coefficient from a regression of firms’ monthly holding period
stock returns on the monthly percentage change in the Producer Price Index
for 24 months prior to fiscal-year end. See Guay (1999), Zhang (2009), and
Donohoe (2015).
Controls
FI Foreign income, defined as pre-tax foreign income (pifo) divided by lagged
total assets (at).
MA Indicator variable equal to 1 if cash flow from mergers and acquisitions (aqc)
is not equal to 0, and 0 otherwise.
SIZE Firm size, defined as the log of total assets (at).
BIGN Indicator variable equal to 1 if auditor is a Big 4/5 firm, and 0 otherwise.
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Controls (continued)
ROA Return on assets, defined as pre-tax income (pi) divided by average total
assets (at).
INSTOWN Institutional ownership, defined as the percentage of common shares held
by institutions at the end of the calendar quarter closest to firms’ fiscal year-
end obtained from Thomson Reuters. The percentage of common shares
held by institutions at the end of a calendar quarter is calculated as the sum
of a firm’s shares held by each institution divided by total outstanding
common shares.
GDP_GROWTH Percentage change in gross domestic product between year t and t-1. Source:
Compustat Economic Indicators.
IMR Inverse Mills ratio calculated based on the coefficient estimates from Eq. (1).
Voluntary disclosure variables
MKT_SHARE Market value of equity (prcc_f*csho) divided by industry market value of
equity (industry defined as 3-digit SIC code).
HHI Herfindahl index, defined as sum of squared market share for each industry-
year. Market share is calculated as firm revenue (sale) divided by industry
revenue using all available Compustat data (industry defined as 3-digit SIC
code) multiplied by (-1).
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APPENDIX B – QUANTITATIVE DISCLOSURES
Quantitative disclosures SFAS 133
Derivatives designated as cash flow (CF) or fair value (FV) hedges
Income statement Gain/loss recognized in earnings representing hedge ineffectiveness
Gain/loss excluded from hedge effectiveness
Amount reclassified into earnings as a result of discontinued CF hedges
Gain/loss recognized in earnings when a hedged firm commitment no
longer qualifies as a FV hedge
Balance sheet No disclosures required
OCI Estimate of the amount to be reclassified from OCI into earning in the next
12 months (CF hedges)
Non-designated derivatives
Income statement No disclosures required
Balance sheet No disclosures required
OCI N/A
Quantitative disclosures SFAS 161
Derivatives designated as cash flow (CF) or fair value (FV) hedges
Income statement Amount reclassified into earnings as a result of discontinued CF hedges
Gain/loss recognized in earnings when a hedged firm commitment no
longer qualifies as a FV hedge
Gains and losses included in the income statement
Gains and losses presented separately for derivatives in CF and FV hedges
Gains and losses presented separately by type of derivative
Location and amount of gains and losses in the income statement
Gains and losses on the hedged item (FV hedge)
Balance sheet Fair value amounts presented as separate asset and liability values
Fair value amounts presented separately for designated and non-designated
derivatives
Fair value amounts presented separately by type of derivatives
Balance sheet line item that includes fair value amounts
OCI Estimate of amount to be reclassified from OCI into earning in the next 12
months (CF hedges)
Gains and losses recognized in OCI (CF hedges)
Gains and losses reclassified from OCI into earnings (CF hedges)
Non-designated derivatives
Income statement Gains and losses included in the income statement
Gains and losses presented separately by type of derivative
Location and amount of gains and losses in the income statement
Balance sheet Fair value amounts presented as separate asset and liability values
Fair value amounts presented separately for designated and non-designated
derivatives
Fair value amounts presented separately by type of derivatives
Balance sheet line item that includes fair value amounts
OCI N/A
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APPENDIX C – CALCULATION OF THE DISCLOSURE SCORE
Total gain/losses of derivatives are disclosed 1pt
Gain/losses disclosed by type of risk hedged (interest rate, foreign exchange, commodity
price, equity price)
1 pt
Gain/losses disclosed separately for designated and non-designated derivatives 1 pt
Gain/losses disclosed by income statement line item 1 pt
Net impact on OCI disclosed 1 pt
Impact on OCI disaggregated between deferred gains/losses on cash flow hedges and
amount transferred to income
1 pt
Maximum score 6 pts
